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I. Introduction 
The new paradigm on comba디ng corruption by objec디ve m와lage­
ment on the basis of comprehensive approach develops only after 
the observation that corrup디on and economic development are 
correlated (Kang 하ld Lee 2003). It is characterised by shift ing 삼le 
equilibrium point of corruption downward. On the basis of this. 
policy m따cers should choose an 。이ec디ve by comprehensive approach: 
scientific measurement enhances understan며ng which contributes 
to the control. and thus facilitates improvement. This su잃ests that 
scientific measurement or evaluation is essential. One criterion to 
detennine the level of corrup디on in a country is the level of 
economic development indicators such as income. 
A v않iety of studies shows 하1 inverse relationship between 
corruption and economic efficiency. For ex하nple. Abed and Davoodi 
(2000. p. 18. 32). based on a sin링e cross-sectional data for 25 
countries from the 1999 Intemational Monetary Fund fund staff 
and World Development Indicators (World Bank). present the results 
of ordinruγ least squ강es (。녕，) regressions in which 킹1 밍1디-corruption 
index with a sc외e of 0 to 10 (hi방lly corrupt=O: highly clean= 10) 
is regressed on real per capita gr뼈th rate. πley find that hi앙ler 
gro\\반1 is significantly related to lower corrup디on at the 1 percent 
level: a one unit increase in corrup디on index increases the growth 
rate by 2.64%. Variations in initial real per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). initial life expect요ncy. the ratio of fiscal b외ance to 
GDP. 없ld inflation 하e controlled for. In brief. corrup디on is 
nega디vely related to economic development ‘ 
On the other hand. Lipset (1 96이 와gues that hi앙lly developed 
economies can more easily detect corrupt behaviours 바lan less 
developed countries. because the fOIIner countries are able to 
provide citizens with more access to better education. greater 
literacy. and more imperson외 relations than the latler countries. In 
a similar vein. there is a tendency for economically stable and 
developed countries to be more likely to have an institutionalised 
efficient poli디C외 system. A more institutionalised poli디C외 system 
would recognise the difference of public roles from private interests 
and would not tolerate corrup디on (Hun디n휠on 1968). Choi (2004) 
려so su잃，ests that those countries with advanced economic develop-
ment have sufficient resources to tackle corrup디on. In sum. the 
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more economically developed a country is , the lower the level of 
corrup디on will be. 
For example, Korea ranked 25th in tenns of the per capita GDP 
converted with Purchasing Power Parity (hereafter per capita real 
income) across 133 countries in 2002 , whereas she ranked 50th in 
the COTTUpüon Perception Index. This suggests that Korea has a 
hi항1 level of corruption relative to the level of per capita real 
lncome. 
E.xternal shocks such as institutional reform , education, and 
infonnation technology as well as severe regula디on (e.g. , exposure 
and punishment) would tend to shift the equilibrium point of 
corrup디on downward. Corruption occurs as a result of asymmeσic 
information in the principal-agent-client relationship. Therefore , an 
efficient instrument for a reduction in corrup디on is to introduce a 
checks and balances system. A checks 없ld balances system will 
reduce monopoly 없ld discretion , and raise accountabili양 and 
transparency, thus shifting 삼le equilibrium p이nt of corrup디on 
downward. 
This can also apply to 야le private sector. An implication is that 
the private sectors should establish an the objective on the basis 
of comprehensive approach and develop a checks 와ld balances 
system. 
On the other hand, economic performance is one criterion of 
national competitiveness. For ex없nple， Porter, Sachs, 밍ld McArthur 
(2002 , p. 17), hereafter referred to as PSM , assert that the principal 
factors that contribute to glob려 compe디tiveness ， and thereby 
improve li띠ng standards, will differ for economies at different levels 
of development. The positive effects of both private sector integ디낀 
(hereafter business integrity) and public sector integri양 on national 
compe디디veness also suggest that the benefits of combating corrup-
tion are greater than the costs. 
For example , Lee (2003 , p. 149) examines the linear form of the 
produc디on model of national compe디디veness as measured by 2002 
national competitiveness score across twenty countries compiled by 
the Intemational M없lagement Development (IMD Yearbook of 2002). 
He presents evidence from the OLS and two-stage least squares 
(TSLS) estimates of the national competitiveness par밍neter of 
business integriψ that a lQ-point increase in business integrity 
increases national compe디디veness by 14.86 points; by 4.26 points 
directly and by 10.60 points indirectly, 감lrough three indicators of 
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economic development (viz .• per capita real income. investment. 없ld 
trade). The estimated results suggest that corrup다on reduces eco-
nomic efficiency in the business sector. which in tUIn deteriorates 
national compe디디veness. 
In this paper. we view national compe디디veness as the outcome of 
a produc디on process inv이피ng national compe디tiveness inputs such 
as economic perfolInance and the level of corrup디on in both the 
business 와ld public sectors. This then suggests that differences in 
corrup다on 하e causal to differentials in national competitiveness. 
Given the importance of national compe다tiveness. lower levels of 
corruption in both business and public sectors may be considered 
j따1tly in policy fOlInulation and national competitiveness outcomes. 
Using unique business 밍ld public sector-level data from 삼úrty­
two countries we first examine Kang and Lee’ s proposition 야1at a 
n멍a디ve correlation between corrup디on 킹ld economic perfonnance 
develops only after the hypothesis that economic perfOI III밍lce yields 
benefici려 effects on national compe디디veness. This reveals that the 
mechanism behind the corruption-economic perform없lce rela디onship 
may also give 디se to the econoIl1Ìc perfoIIuance-national competi-
tiveness relation. 
Furthennore. we attempt to explore the possibility that caus외 
relationships 없nong per capita real income. business integrity. and 
public sector integ디ty potenti려ly exist: caus려ity running from 
business integrity to per capita real income as well as public sector 
integrity. 윈ld from per capita real income and public sector 
integrity to business integrity. 
-two countries were selected for study due to the 
availability of data such as national compe디디veness score. business 
sector corruption index. and public sector corruption index. Even 
though 야1irty-two counσies do not pro띠de sufficient observations to 
allow a full econometric evaluation of the causal relationships 
among the selected variables. the data offer accessible national 
compe디tiveness score. opacity index. and corruption percep디on 
index by coun삼y. 
This paper is org없1ised as follows. Section II develops the 
an외.ytical framework that highlights the direct 밍ld indirect effects 
of both business integrity 없ld public sector integπty on national 
competi디veness 띠a per capita real income. Section III describes the 
data. Section IV presents 없ld discusses the empiric외 results. More 
specifically. a cross-national comparison is made in this section. 
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Section V concludes. 
11. Ana1ytica1 Framework 
πle p디mary purpose of this section is to speci:(y the proposition 
that the mechanism behind the corruption-economic performance 
relationship may also give rise to the economic performance 
-na디on려 competi디veness rela디on. Causal relationships between anti 
-corruption 없ld national compe디tiveness， 없ld between anti-corruption 
and national competitiveness via economic development indicator in 
describing the characteristics of the stock of individual country i 
can be written , in a functional form , as: 
NC, = J(Y" AOI" ACPI,: X ‘) (1) 
Y, = 9 (AOl;, ACPI,: X ,) (2) 
AOI, 二 h (ACPI" Y,: X;) (3) 
ACPI, = k (AOI" Y,: X;) (4) 
where NC, denotes the level of national competitiveness in the ith 
country. Y, denotes per capita real income. AOI, and ACPI, denote 
the level of business integrity and public sector integrity, respectively. 
X, indicates the interaction term interacted the regressor in the 
respective equa디ons with a binarγ variable distinguishing the two 
groups; outlying countries-하ld no outlying countries of 32 countries. 
Outlying countries could be selected from a scatter-plot between the 
variables presented in appendix. We set the value of the variable to 
zero and the value of a binary variable , signi엔ng that the value 
was missing to one. For example, 0 1 * AOI, indicates an interaction 
variable interacted outlying observations, 0 1, with AOI, in the 
national competitiveness equa디on. 
The introduction of the interaction variable allows us to estimate 
the differences in the coefficients of the slope between the two 
groups. 
On an a priori basis , the coefficient of the interaction variable is 
pOSi다ve depending on the directions of the slopes of the four 
equations due to the outlying country dummy. Because the dummy 
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has units for outlying countries. a posi디ve sign of the coefficient of 
the interaction variable would mean that the slope of each function 
increased due to outlying countries. For ex강nple. a posi디ve sign of 
Ol*AOI; in equation (1) indicates that national competitiveness may 
be stren!안hened at a faster rate in outlying countries as business 
integrity increases. 
Equa디ons (2). (3). and (4) also comply with the hypothesis that 
causal rela디onships among per capita real income. business 
integrity. 와ld public sector integrity exist. The following equation in 
its reduced-fonn c킹1 be derived: 
V; = v (X;) (5) 
where V;= (Y;. AOI;. ACPI;) ’ refers to the row vector of the 
dependent variables and where X; refers to the column vector of X; 
in a reduced-fonn. 
Equations (1 )-(5) stand for well-behaved production functions 
exhibiting everywhere diminishing retulIls to inputs. Per capita real 
income. business integrity. 없1d public sector integrity are comple-
mentary to each other and therefore business integrity 킹1d public 
sector integrity c와1 be viewed as nonnal goods. This me강lS that 
the cross effects among these variables are posi디ve: the second 
cross partial derivatives are posi디ve (e.g .. a2 y/ a AOI. a ACPI. a2AOI 
/ a y. δ ACPI. and a2ACPI/ a y. a AOI>O). 
Equations (1 )-(5) show that there are four channels tlrrou맹 which 
business integrity 밍1d public sector integrity each 따fect national 
compe디tiveness. For example. business integrity affects national 
compe디디veness directly and indirectly. 삼lTOU!멧 public sector integrity 
as well as per capita real income. 
dNC/ dAOI = NCy *yACP/* (dACPI/ dAOl) + NCAcp/*ACPly*(dY / dAOl) 
+ NCy*(dY / dAOl) + NCAcp/*(dACPI/ dAOl) + NCAO/ 
dNC / dACPI = NCy*YAOI*(dAOI / dACPl) + NCAOI* AOIy*(dY / dACPl) 
+ NCy*(dY / dACPl) + NCAO/*(dAOI/ dACPl) + NCACP/ 
A schematic view (Figure 1) presents the logic외 linkages among 
the null hypotheses given in equa디ons (1 )-(5). lt depicts business 














Public Sector Intergrity 
(ACPI) 
Notes: 1) Arrows relevant to the causation direction. 
2) Predicted directions in parentheses 
FIGURE 1 
THE EFFECT OF BUSINESS INTEGRI1γ AND PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY 
ON NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 
integrity and public sector integrity 따fe띠ng nationa1 competitiveness 
directly 밍ld indirectly, through an economic indicator (viz. , per 
capita real income). 
For example, the direct effect captures the impact of a change in 
the business integrity on nationa1 competi디veness. The indirect 
effects measure the effect on nationa1 competi디veness of a change 
in the business inte양j양， due to a ch밍1ge in per capita rea1 income. 
It also depicts two causa1 relationships between business integ디낀 
and public sector integrity, implying that 없1 increase in business 
integrity raises public sector integrity, which in turn leads to 
economic performance and thereby nationa1 competitiveness. 
In order to reinforce the regression results that business integrity 
and public sector integrity each affect national competitiveness, 
thirty-two countries are classified into three groups according to per 
capita real income. Then the structura1 equation on national 
competitiveness is defined by: 
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where DI includes countries with per capita rea1 income greater 
than the mean value of U.S. $ 12.593: Singapore. U.S.A.. U.K.. 
Hong Kong. ltaly. Hung;없y， Israel. Greece , Japan. Taiwan. and 
Czech Republic. D2 includes countries with per capita real income 
lower than the me하1 value: Chile. Mexico. Uruguay, Uthuania. 
Peru , Colombia. South Africa. Argentina. Bra깅1 ， Venezuela. India. 
Poland, Guatemala. Thailand. Ecuador. Romania. Turkèy. Indonesia. 
Russian Federa디on. and China. D3 indicates Korea. 
From equation (6) 야le elas디city of national compe디디veness with 
respect to business integrity 하ld public sector integrity c하1 be 
obtained. A hi방ler elas디city is associated with a stronger national 
compe디디veness ， s명ges다ng 삼lat anti-corruption policies in both 
business and public sectors should be sσen땅hened. 
The coefficient on D3 which denotes Korea is equ려 to the value 
of the constant telIIl. Therefore. in order to avoid the problem of 
mul디collinearity 킹ld to estimate a cross-national coml갱rison we 
rely on OLS regression throu!맺 the origin (Wooldridge 2000. pp. 
220-1). 
111. Data 
The data for 삼1is investiga디on is from the 2002 Global Compet-
itiveness Report. the 2002 Opa다ty lnde)(, and the 2003 Comψtion 
Perception lndex compiled by the World Econon1ic Forum (WEF). 
pπce Waterhouse Coopers (PWCl. and Tr;킹lsparency Inter- national 
(TI) , respec디vely. Details of the data sources are given in Table 1. 
The national competi디veness variable in the above model. NC. 
implies a positive effect. so that a hi방ler score in that variable will 
be associated with r리atively stronger national compe디tiveness in a 
country. 
The econon1ic perfolIIlance variable , y , is measured as a per 
capita GDP converted with Purchasing Power P하ity (PPP) , referred 
to as per capita real income. 
For the rela디ve extent of business sector and public sector 




BUSINESS INTEGRITY AND PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY 133 
TABLE 1 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
Vartable 
NationaI Competitiveness Score 
Per Capita Gross Domestic Product 
Converted with Purchasing Power 얹rity 
Uncorrupted Index in the Business 















ACPI4J Uncorrupted Index in the Public Sector 45.594 
-0.194 12.638*** : Public Se따.or Integrity (20.409) 
Notes: 1) Transf.ormati.on: VaIue in 야lis paper=the .originaI WEF Nati.onaI 
C.ompetitiveness Sc.ores times 10. 
2) In U.5'; Th.ousand D.oIIars. 
3) Transf.ormati.on: VaIue in this paper= 100 minus the .originaI 
PWC Opacity Index. 
4) Transf.onnati.on: VaIue in this paper=야le .ori핑naI TI C.orrupti.on 
Percepti.on Index times 10. 
5) *** indicates significance at the 1 % IeveI .on a 1:1ν.0-tailed test. 
1).3) ,4) ScaIe .of 0 t .o 100. 
5 .ources: 1),2) 찌T.orld EC.onomic F.orum, The Global Competitiveness Report 
2002 , 2003. 
3) Price Waterh.ouse C.o.opers , The Opac때 Index, 2002. 
4) T떠nsparency Intemati.on aI, CPI, 2003. 
indexes. To facilitate interpretation of the results the variables are 
transformed into 100 minus the origin떠 PWC index and 10 times 
the ori멍n머 TI index. Consequently, each of the two transformed 
values implies a positive effect. so that a higher value in each will 
be associated with relatively higher level of business integri양 (AOI) 
as well as public sector integri양 (ACPI). 
Table 1 shows that all the variables are normally distributed. For 
each statement. wherever necessary. the qu혀ification ‘on average’ is 
to be understood. A list of data used in this study is aVailable on 
request. 
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TAm,E 2 
T꺼E SPEARMAN'S RANK ORDER CORREIATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG 
SELECTED V ARlABLES 
NC-Y NC-AOI NC-ACPI Y-AOI Y-ACPI AOI-ACPI 
0.775*** 0.588*** 0.889*** 0.599*** 0.811 *** 0.782*** 
Note: NC. Y‘ AOI. and ACPI denote National Competitiveness. Per Capita 
Real lncome. Business lntegrity. 와ld Public Sector lntegrtty. 
respectively. For more details on the definition of variables see Table 
1. *** inrucates sigr따ìcance at the 1 % level on a two-u;퍼ed test. 
IV. Estimation Resu1ts 
1n this section. we test K밍19 and Lee’s proposition that both 
business integrity 하ld public sector integrity yield beneficial effects 
on econornic perfonuance. Given that economic perfonnance is 
positively related to national compe디tiveness. it tUI'IlS out that 
national compe디tiveness may be strengthened by enhanced 
business integrity 밍ld public sector integrity directly and indirectly. 
야lrough econornic perfonIlance. For example. the direct effect is 
obtained by the partial derivative of business integrity on 
competitiveness. The indirect effect indicates that business integrity 
affects economic perfOl mance and thereby national compe디tiveness. 
We also ex없nine the possibility that causal relationships among 
per capita real income. business integrity. and public sector 
integrity potentially exist. Hence we further attempt to explore 
whether business integri양 앙fects public sector integrity. which in 
tUI Il leads to econornic perfonnance and thereby national compe디­
tiveness. 
Table 2 contains the Speannan’s rank order correlation coefficient 
among the selected variables. 
Cle값ly. it indicates that richer countries have stronger national 
compe다디veness. higher business integrity. and higher public sector 
integrity 암1밍1 poorer countries. 1t also shows that the higher a 
country's IeveI of each of business integri양 하ld public sector 
integrity. the more econornically developed the country wiIl be. This 
implies that the considerable associations 없nong per capita real 
income. business integrity. 킹ld public sector integrity primarily 
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TABLE 3 
NON-NESTED TEST OF DOUBLE 1ρGARITHMIC VERSUS LINEAR MODELS OF 
NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS. PER CAPITA REAL INCOME. BUSINESS INTEGRITY. 




































2) The Box-Cox procedure as described by Maddala (J,.977. p. 317). For 
example. the Box-Cox procedure for the national competi-
디veness function (NC) involves dividing each NC, by the geometric 
mean of the NC/s; the exponential of the mean of the natural 
logarithm of NC. Then we es디mate the two equations (double 
natural log때삼unic and linear) and choose the one with the smaller 
residual sum of squares (RSS). 
3) The Theil ma잉mum a이usted multiple determination criterion as 
described by Maddala (1992. p .497). For ex밍nple. the estimated 
value of A여 .R2 for the national competi디veness function is larger 
in the double natural logarithmic model (A예.R2 =0.799) than in 
the linear model (A매 R 2 =0.771). su잃'es디ng that the linear model 
C없1 be r밍ected. 
result from a system of multiple causations. 
We restrict the estimations to a linear multiplicative functional 
form (or double-natural 10밍 because this form empirically has been 
shown to be the most adequate in cross-country comparisons of 
national competitiveness. We addressed the functional form issue 
using the Box-Cox transformation framework and the Theil ma외 
mum a대usted multiple determination (1\예 ，R2) criterion in Table 3 
The double-natural logarithmic model run by OLS is implied in 
the estimated regressions for national competitiveness and per 
capita real income. whereas the linear transformation is suitable in 
the estimated regressions for business integriψ and public sector 
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TABLE 4 
DIAGNOSTIC EvALUATION OF EACH EgUATION FOR NATIONAL 






AND PuSLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY: THE OLS ESTlMATES 































Note: *** and γ indicate si맑ificance at the 1 % and 5% levels on a 
two-tailed test. respectively. For the test procedure see Dowrick 
(1993. p.2). and Lewis. 0 ’ Brien. and Thampapillai (1 990. p. 296 and 
pp.302-7). 
integrity. 
As a general test for misspecification. we use Ramsey’s RESET2 
test. It assumes that the effect of omitted variables can be pro잉ed 
by some function of the ori핑n려 regressors. In Table 4. 삼le regression 
results of the test suggest that the null hypothesis of functional 
fOIm misspecifica디on is r밍ected in 외1 the estimated OLS regressions. 
On the other hand. the observed Durbin-Watson (D.W.) sta디S디C 
lies between du 밍ld the value of 4-du. implying that with one 
exception (the AOI equation) correct specifica디ons are implied in 외1 
three of the estimated OLS regressions. With small cross-section 
data sets comprised of thirty-two countries the power of the test 
will depend on the way in which the observations are ordered. Here 
the thirty-two countries are ordered as they appear in the data 
package of the 2002 Opaci띠 I nd.ex compiled by Price Waterhouse 
Coopers: the extelIlal data source organisation. 
πle obseπed value of the R? is hi방1 and the estimated F-statistic 
is larger 야1하1 삼le 99 per cent critical value. 
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TABLE 5 
TESTS FOR ENDOGENEI1Y AMONG PER CAPITA REAL INCOME. BUSINESS 
INTEGRI1Y. AND PuBLIC SECTOR INTEGRI1Y 




0.709 F(2.24) = 16.113*** 
0.837 F(2,24)=32.736*** t=5.247*** 





Note: ***. **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% !evels 
on a two-tailed test, respectively. See Beggs (1988 , p.96) for the joint 
F test procedure 없ld Dowrick (l993. p.2) for the individual t test 
procedure. 
On the basis of the RESET2 specifica디on test and the estimated 
values of R2 • F 없ld D.W.. it can be suggested that all four 
estimated OLS regressions are correct1y specified, indicating that 
the assumption of zero expected values of residuals is not violated. 
In the reported regressions in Table 4. heteroskedasticity could 
not be detected. Consequent1y. it can be seen from the OLS 
regressions that the assump디on that the variances of the 
disturbances are appro잉mately constant for all of the thirty-two 
countries cannot be rejected. 
In the estimated equations for per capita real income. business 
integriψ， 없ld public sector integriψ. tests for endogenei양 are 
carried out by augmenting the OLS regression with each of the 
predicted and the residual (resid) values of the suspected regressor 
of endogeneity from the reduced-form estimation. The joint F tests 
and individual t-tests are reported. It can be concluded from the 
tests for endogenei낀 in Table 5 that, ceteπs paπbus. per capita real 
income. business integrity. 없ld public sector integrity are positively 
inter-related. 
Table 6 reports the direct. indirect. and total effects for both 
business integ디방 and public sector integri양 on national competi-
tiveness from parameter estimates of equations (1)-(4). 
All the equations for per capita real income. business integrity. 
and public sector integrity are estimated using both OLS and TSLS 
methods. since all the equations are identified with rows and 
columns whose determinants are non-zero (see, e.g .. Baumol (1 977. 
pp.237-52)). In this study. we analyse OLS results over the TSLS 
results in each of the three equations for the possibili양 of sample 
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TABI.E 6 






IEl IE2 IE3 IE4 
Business Inte맑ity 0.150 2.141 0.142 0.187 0.077 2.697 
Public Sector Integrity 0.071 0.416 0.240 0.038 
Notes: IEl=NCy*강CfJ*(dACPl/ dAOl} 원ld NCY*YAQI*(dAOI/dACPll 
IE2=NCA(꺼*ACPIy*(dYldAOl} 없ld NCAOI*AOIy*(dY/dACpl} 
IE3 =NCy*(dYl dA01) 따ld NCy*(dYl dACPI] 
IE4 =NCACPI*(dACPI/dA01) and NCA하(dAOI/dACPl) 
DE=NCAα 밍1d NCACPI 
TE= dNC/dAOI 와1d dNC/dACPI=IE1+IE2+IE3+IE4+DE 
0.300 
DE 없1d IE can be obtained from the following OLS esωnates: 
lnNC, = 2.433 + O.046.lnYi + 0.036' lnAOI, + 0.282. lnACPI, 
{0.13끼*** (0.026)* (0.04끼 (0 여6)*** 
- 0.045.01*lnAOI, ~ 0.173'α*lnY， 
(0.011)*** (0.069)** 
Jil(Adj.Jf) = O. 906{0. 888). Joint F{2 ,26) test = 50.262*** , 
Chow (=4.091*** , D.W. =2.556 
lnY, = -3.461 - 0.497' lnAOI, ~ 1.035. lnACPI, - O.189. Ü:!*lnAOl, 
(0.89이*** (0.395) (0.28꺼*"'* (0.09찌** 
Jil(Adj.한) =0.695(0.663) , Joint F{1.28) test=21.303***. 
Chow t=2.054** , D.W. =2.251 
AOI, = 16.971 + O.498.ACPI, + 0.015. Yi + 1.426.04*Yi 
(3.569)*** (0.123)*** (0.293) (0.663)** 
Jf(A며j.Jf) =0.687(0.653) , Joint F{ I ，앓:) test =20.485* **. 
Chow t=2.151** ’ D.w.=1.313 
ACPI, = 2.665 ~ 0.624.AOI, -+- 1.348. yi -• 1.872 0안K 
(5.513) (0.168)*** (0.251)*** (1.063)* 
Jil뻐dj.Jil)=0.818(0.798) ， Joint F{1.28) test=4 1.824*** , 
Chow t= 1.761* , D.w.=1.859 
1.065 
where values in p강-entheses are the estimated absolute standard enors of 
the regr않sion ∞efficients. ***. **. and ,. indicate si，맑ificance at the 1%. 
5%. and l00k levels on a two-tailed test. respec디vely. 
From the joint F test and the Chow ( test for the interaction varïable we 
reject the null hypothesis of no coefficient instab피ty for the estimated 1머VC. 
lnY. AOI. 없1d ACPI equations. In order to test for stability. we perfOIm the 
joint F-test and the Chow ( test. The joint F-test of the si명ifi않nce involves 
augrnenting the regression with the new interaction variable. The regression 
res띠ts confi 1111 that the es디mated equation of each of the functions 
coefficients is not stable between the two groups: outlying ∞untries-와1d no 
outlying countries of 32 countries. See Beggs (1988. p.97) for the j애1t F test 
procedure and G없nn없ηs (1985) for the Chow t test procedure. 
In the double natural logarithmic 여uation the impact at mar핑n can be 
obtained by: ∞efficient*DEPENDENI‘πan/REGRESSORnean 
where DEPENDENfrnean 와ld REGRESSORnean 따em않n value of each of the 
dependent 와1d expl와latory v하iables. 
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selection bias because the sample is limited to thirty-two countries 
which do not generate a sufficient number of observations (Zarkin. 
French, Mroz. and Bray 1998, p.65). 
We further use the standard errors of the estimates (SEE) in 
choosing between the OLS 밍ld TSLS regressions (Maddala 1977. p. 
287). The TSLS estimates of per capita real income. business 
integrity. 없ld public sector integri양 have higher SEE than the OLS 
estimates. 
The OLS estimates on per capita real income and national 
compe디tiveness su잃:est that differences in both business integri낀 
and public sector integrity are causal to per capita real income and 
na디onal competitiveness. 
It is also evident from Table 6 that two causal relationships 
exist; a higher level of business integrity affecting a higher level of 
public sector integrity, 없ld a higher level of public sector integrity 
affec디ng a higher level of business integriψ; a IO-point increase in 
business integriψ increases public sector integriψ by 6.24 points. 
Conversely, a 10-point increase in public sector integri방 lncreases 
business integrity by 4.98 points. 
Thus. 밍1 increase in business integrity raises public sector 
integrity. which in tum leads to economic performance as measured 
by per capita real income and thereby national competi디veness; a 
10-point increase in business integrity increases national competi-
tiveness by 26.97 points; by 0.70 point directly and by 26.27 
points indirectly. due to increases in per capita real income and 
public sector integrity (see also Notes on Table 6). 
On the other hand. a 10-point increase in public sector integrity 
increases national competitiveness by 10.65 points; by 3.00 points 
directIy and by 7.65 point indirectly, due to increases in per capita 
real income 없ld business integrity. 
Given the estimations. both business integriψ and public sector 
integrity can contribute substantially to per capita real income and 
national compe디디veness. 
Consequently. the econometric results are consistent with Kang 
and Lee’s proposition (2003) that corruption reduces economic 
efficiency in the business sector as well as the public sector. 
Therefore. an efficient instrument for reducing corrup디on is to 
introduce a checks and balances system in both sectors. A checks 
and baIances system will reduce monopoly and discretion , and 
raise accountabiliψ and transparency, thus shifting the equilibrium 
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TABLE 7 
EsrIMATES OF THE ELASTICrIY OF SECTORAL INTEGRl1Y ON 








Dl D:z D:J 
Business Int명lity 0.297 0.256 0.346 1.742 775.666*** (AOl) (0.392)*** (0.319)*** (1.538)*** 
Public sector Int용~ty 0.279 0.260 0.303 2202 2034489*** 
(0.228)*** (0.20이*** (0.835)*** (ACPl) 
Notes: 1) Values in paren앙1eses are the estinlated absolute standard eπors 
of the regression coefficients. *** indicates signifiCaTlce at the 10/0 
level on a two-tailed test. In order to avoid the problem of mul디­
C뼈neality we rely on OLS regression throu힐1 the oli맹1. 
In choosing among linear. semilog:양i야lffiÏc. and double natural 
log뼈thmic models. the Theil ma섭rnum a며usted multiple 
determination (Adj .lf) criterion is applied. See for example. 
Maddala (1992. p.497). On the basis of AI매.한. the semilog:앙i­
thrnic model run by OLS is implied in the two estinlated 
regressions. For example. the estinlated value of Adj.lf for each 
of the two national competi디veness functions (Ni디 is larger in the 
semilog:없ithrnic model than in the linear 와ld double natural 
log없ithrnic models. sugges다ng 삼1at the semilog:없ithrnic model 
C윈mot be r，멍ected. A full OLS estinlates are as follows: 
NCi = 12.737Dl*lnAOli + 10.968.마*lnAOI，‘+ 14.837D:J*lnAOli 
Adj.한=0.986 
NC‘= 11.976D1*lnACPI1+ 11. 142D:z*lnACPI1+ 13.001D:J*lr어CPli 
Adj.lf = 0.995 
From the above estimated α>efficient. the elasticity of national COII￥>eti­
tiveness with re5pect to each of r，쩍훌ressors at mean value can be 
obtained as; αJ*(I/DEPENDENfmeanl 
where α:J denotes the estirnated coefficient of the respective rcgressor 
and where DEPENDENfmoan denotes 앙1e II뚱an value of the depelldent 
variable. Niα. 
For 잉æmple. the elasticity of national competitiveness with respect 
to business intl야~ty (AOl) interacted with Dl can be obtained as; 
12.737*(1 /42.913) = 0.297 
where the m않n value of NC (DEPENDENfmeanl is 42.913. 
2) The estirnated D.W. value lies between du and the value of 4-du. 
implying that correct s야잉fica디ons are implied in the 뻐'0 estirnated 
αS r'야!1~‘sions. 
3) πle observed joint F-statistic 잉 greater than the 99 per cent clitical 
V혀ue. su잃;esting that the null hyp떠lesis of no coefficient instability 
IS r멍ected. 
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point of corruption downward. 
It c없1 also be observed from the reported regressions in Table 6 
that business integrity has greater total effects on national 
competitiveness th없1 public sector integrity. 
In Table 6. the significance of the constant tenn in each of the 
national competi디veness. per capita real income. and business 
integrity equa디ons indicates that the unobserved factors are 
significant in explaining variations in business integ디ty. per capita 
real income. and national competitiveness. For example. lower level 
of barriers to entIy in a countl)' may be associated with higher 
business integri양 하ld thereby stronger national compe디tiveness. 
In cross-national comparisons as shown in Table 7. national 
competi디veness is more elastic with respect to both business 
integrity and public sector integri양 in Korea than in the other 
countries. In order to raise Korea’s national competitiveness. 
therefore. anti-corruption policies in both the business and public 
sectors should be streng야lened. 
For the es디mation we classify thi띠r-two countries into three 
groups according to per capita real income. The first group. Dl. 
includes countries with per capita real income greater than the 
me없1 value of U.S. $ 12.593. The second group. D 2 • includes 
countries with per capita real income lower than the mean value. 
The third group. D3. indicates Korea. 
Given that business integrity 따ld public sector integrity each has 
a positive effect on per capita real income. this suggests that 
business integrity. public sector integ디ty. 없ld per capita real 
income are positively inter-related. It turns out that they complement 
each other and therefore business integrity and public sector 
integrity can be viewed as nonnal goods. Consequently. the choice 
of policy instruments should not be based on a stability 밍lalysis of 
a single final target variable. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
This paper's main objective is to investigate the new paradigm on 
combating corruption in both business and public sectors as 
proposed by K없19 and Lee (2003) , 밍ld to examine the causal 
relationships 밍nong per capita real income , business integri양， 없ld 
public sector integrity. 
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On the basis of this study. both the business 없ld public sectors 
should establish 와1 objec디ve on the basis of comprehensive 
approach 없ld develop a checks and balances system. For ex하nple. 
Korea ranked 25th in tenns of the per capita GDP converted with 
PPP across 133 countries in 2002. whereas she ranked 50th in the 
CollLψtion Perception lndex. 
An implica디on of this is that Korea has a hi앙1 level of 
corruption relative to the level of income. Therefore. 삼le appropriate 
corruption rank of Korea is 25 among 133 countries. 
On the other hand. economic perfonnance is a criterion of 
national compe디tiveness (see. e.g .• PSM. 2002). 까le positive effects 
of both business integrity 와ld public sector integrity on national 
compe디디veness also su앓est that the benefits of comba디ng 
corrup디on are greater than the costs. 
Given the importance of national compe디디veness via econornic 
perfonnance. a theoretical model is developed. which allows both 
business integrity and public sector integrity to affect national 
compe때veness directly and indirectly. throu양1 econornic perfOI mance 
as measured by per capita real income. The model is estimated 
using a cross-sectional data of 삼úrty-two countries from the 2002 
Global Competitiveness Repoπ. combined with the 2002 Opacity 
lndex and the 2003 C07TUption Perception lndex. 
The overall results and analysis of the estimated models allow for 
the fo11o뼈ng summary remarks to be made regarding the proposi디ons 
tested: 
1. The regression results suggest that causal relationships 밍nong 
per capita real income. business integrity. 킹ld public sector 
integrity exist. Therefore. the choice of policy instruments 
should not be based on a stability an외ysis of a single final 
target variable. This implies. for example. that business 
integrity may be facilitated directly by enhanced compe디tion 
and accoun디ng tr킹lsparency or indirectly by increased public 
sector integrity throu!핏 regulatoxy refonn and by hi앙ler 
income , 없ld that income may be raised directly by increased 
levels of sk i11 or indirectly by increased business integrity 없ld 
public sector integrity through enhanced competi디on 밍ld 
accounting transparency 없ld regulatoxy refOI Il1. 
2. Given the estimations. both business integ디양 and public 
sector 
capita 
integrity c밍1 m하‘e a substantial contribution to per 
real income and national compe디디veness. More 
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TABLE 8 
THE EFFECT OF A 10-POINT INCREASE IN BUSINESS INTEGRI1Y AND PUBLIC 
SECTOR INTEGRI1Y ON NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS AND 
PER CAPITA REAL INCOME: THE CASE OF KOREA 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Business Integrity (AOl) 













Notes: 1) Korea’s nationaI competi디veness score in 2002 is 48.9 points. 
Given that a 10-point increase in each of business integrity and 
public sector integrity her nationaI compe디디.veness score becomes 
55.4 points. which is approximately equaI to the le.vel of Taiwan 
(55.0 point in 2002). VaIues in parentheses indicate the 
elasticity of nationaI competi디veness with respect to business 
integrity and public sector integrity. 
2) Per capita GDP converted with PPP (unit: US $). US $4 .4 10 
indicates the difference of per capita real income between 
Taiwan and Korea. 
specifically. business integriψ has a greater effect on per ca-
pita real income and national competitiveness than public 
sector integrity. 
3. In cross-country comparisons. national competi디veness is more 
elastic with respect to business integrity as well as public 
sector integrity in Korea than in the other countries. Given the 
importance of Korea’s national competitiveness via economic 
perfonnance. anti-corrup디on policies in both business and 
public sectors should be strengthened. 
4. Table 8 shows that. in Korea. a 10-point increase in both 
business integrity 없ld public sector integrity increases national 
competitiveness by 6.5 P이nts and per capita real income by 
U.S. $ 4.410. The estimates also suggest that a 10 percent 
increase in both business integrity and public sector integri양 
increases national competitiveness by 6.55 percent. 
5. It can also be obseπed from Table 8 that business integrity 
has a greater effect on per capita real income as well as 
national competitiveness than public sector integri앙. It is also 
evident that national compe디디veness is more elastic with 
respect to business integrity than public sector integ디양. 
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Our results are subject to a number of constraints that should 
be taken into account. For ex밍nple ， 밍.ven the data limitations. 삼le 
level of baIIiers to entry variable could not be inc1uded into the 
business integrity equa디on. In addi디on. 삼Ur양-Vwo countries do not 
provide sufficient observations to allow a full econometric evaluation 
of the causal relationships among the selected variables. Hopefully. 
the conc1usion reached here will stimulate further research and 
discussion in resol띠ng these issues. 
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